Yes, an intellectual giant, Dr. Adebayo Adedeji, age 87, has
passed (http://allafrica.com/stories/201804270611.html).
One of his most influential scholarly products was his "Africa’s
Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programs for Socio-Economic
Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP),” which he spear-headed/championed, as
the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
(ECA) during a time period, in the 1980s, when the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) was executing a spate of economic structural adjustment programs across
African countries through three infamous D's: devaluation, de-nationalization
and deflation that tended to leave those African countries worse-off.
Devaluation meant that in order to receive requested economic
bail-outs/assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the affected
African country should devalue the international worth of its national currency
(for instance, it was this devaluation edict that, along with other
macro-economic factors, set Nigeria's national currency on a plunging path from
the early 1980s when one Nigerian naira could purchase one point. Five ($1.5)
US dollars to where it is now whereby one US dollar is worth three hundred and
sixty or so Nigerian naira); de-nationalization meant economic liberalization
of the affected national economy in terms of opening it up to "free trade,”
removal of tariffs and protection for domestic industries; and deflation meant
that the government in question should remove subsidies from domestic services,
such as healthcare, energy supplies, education, consumer food products, etc..
In sum, these three D’s (as they came to be known amongst development scholars), when implemented, rather than bring about projected economic recovery and growth for the affected country, brought about higher costs of living, hyper inflationary trends within the economy, loss of jobs due to resulting de-industrialization, and general hardship amongst the preponderance of its national population as life sustaining services, such as health-care, food, education, and what have you, became unaffordable for many. These consequences, in turn, tended to engender mass discontent that threatened governmental stability and cohesion across the African political landscape.
In sum, these three D’s (as they came to be known amongst development scholars), when implemented, rather than bring about projected economic recovery and growth for the affected country, brought about higher costs of living, hyper inflationary trends within the economy, loss of jobs due to resulting de-industrialization, and general hardship amongst the preponderance of its national population as life sustaining services, such as health-care, food, education, and what have you, became unaffordable for many. These consequences, in turn, tended to engender mass discontent that threatened governmental stability and cohesion across the African political landscape.
A notable point is that the IMF does not usually insist upon and
require the same levels of draconian and immiserating economic reform measures
of nations of the First World. A good example is the Greek IMF bail-out of the
recent past (https://www.ft.com/content/6756e4f6-ece6-11e6-930f-061b01e236550).
In looking back at the African experience with the IMF, one can
recall that cumulatively, IMF's economic recovery pills of the 1980s
resultantly placed the affected African countries on a path of economic
retrogression and contraction that led to what's commonly referred to as a
“Lost Decade" of the 1980s in African developmental terms. As the
Executive Secretary of ECA, Dr. Adedeji bravely articulated a palliative
blue-print in the form of a set of policy prescriptions dubbed as “Africa’s
Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programs for Socio-Economic
Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP)." In those days, it would be hard to imagine any well-informed higher educational classroom around the globe that dealt with African developmental topics, which would not have considered Professor Adedeji's "Africa's Alternative Framework" a must-read for its students.
Though the document acknowledged and upheld a need for a
structural adjustment of African economies, Adedeji championed an alternative mixture of demand-side & supply-side, public sector-directed approach. It's worth recalling that Barack
Obama's two-term presidency (2008-2016) successfully employed a
similar mixture of demand-side & supply-side, public-sector stimulated strategy in tackling the Great
Economic Recession that engulfed the United States by the tail end of George
Bush’s own two-term Presidency (2000-2008) through the $787
billion American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of
February 2009.
In championing his ECA's “Africa’s Alternative
Framework to Structural Adjustment Programs for Socio-Economic Recovery and
Transformation (AAF-SAP)" (1990), Professor Adedeji effectively stood up
against the grain of the ideas and programs pursued by mega institutions
controlled by the international powers-that-be of his era. But, for the most
part, did African governments listen to him or did they, like Nigeria, fall
head-long for IMF’s consequentially injurious pills? It must be noted
that not many international public scholar-servants tend to take the kind of
risky path that Adedeji traversed on the IMF question, but he did. On this and
several other critical occasions, he stood up for Africa during one of her most
trying moments. May his great soul rest in perfect peace!
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